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Abstract We present the results from a policy experiment in which single mothers
on welfare were stimulated to enter the labor market and increase their work expe-
rience. The aim of the policy was not per se for single mothers to leave welfare
completely but to encourage them to find a job if only a part-time job. Two policy
instruments were introduced: an earnings disregard and job creation. The experiment
was performed at the municipality level in the Netherlands, a country with relatively
high benefits and low incentives for single mothers to leave welfare for work. In our
analysis, we make a distinction between native and immigrant welfare recipients. For
immigrant single mothers, we find a positive employment effect of an earnings dis-
regard. Job creation in addition to the earnings disregard increased working hours for
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some groups of single mothers. Although the outflow from welfare was not affected,
welfare expenditures were reduced.
Keywords Welfare · Single mothers · Policy experiment · Earnings disregard ·
Job creation
JEL Classification C41 · I38 · J64
1 Introduction
In the past decades, political and public attitudes toward welfare recipients have
changed.Welfare recipients including single mothers with young children are encour-
aged to find a job. It is, however, particularly difficult to increase the labor force
participation of single mothers as they have to combine work and childcare and often
for them the financial incentives to go to work are not very strong.1 Usually, ben-
efits are reduced one-for-one when a welfare recipient starts earning. Making work
pay policies have been introduced to strengthen financial incentives to employment,
through in-work benefits, earnings disregards or reemployment bonuses. In-work
benefits are provided conditional on the recipient having a job. Earnings disre-
gards imply that welfare benefits are withdrawn less than one-for-one with earnings.
Reemployment bonuses are provided to unemployed individuals who find a job.2
In-work benefits are popular. In 2007, half of the OECD countries had some form
of in-work benefit policy (Immervoll and Pearson 2009). In the USA, the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a financial incentive program to encourage work among
low-income families with children by providing refundable tax credits or earnings
subsidies. Several studies find that the increased generosity of the EITC as from
1987 had large effects on employment rates (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Ellwood
2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Hotz et al. 2001).3 Financial incentives, however,
worked almost exclusively through the participation margin, while single mothers
were rather unresponsive on the intensive margin (Meyer 2002). Not all previous US
studies find positive effects of financial incentives on single mothers labor supply.
Following a welfare reform in 1996, Matsudaira and Blank (2014) analyze the impact
of changes in earnings disregards (in addition to the EITC, that operates through the
tax system). They exploit state differences in the level of the earnings disregards and
1A large empirical literature has studied labor supply responses to taxes, transfers and active labor market
policies. See, for example, Blundell and Macurdy (1999) and Heckman et al. (1999) for an overview.
2Alternatively, programs of direct job creation and wage subsidies may have a positive effect on employ-
ment at the lower end of the labor market. However, participation in subsidized jobs may stigmatize and
reduce chances of finding a regular job (Boeri 1997). Martin and Grubb (2001) provide an overview of
evaluation findings in OECD countries and conclude that subsidized jobs do not help the unemployed to
get permanent jobs. Kluve (2010) presents a meta-analysis of 137 ALMP evaluation studies in Europe. He
finds that direct employment programs in the public sector are rarely effective and frequently detrimental
for the employment prospects of participants.
3See Ingles (2001) for a survey of US findings.
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find that the changes had little effect on labor supply or income because only few
women used these earnings disregards.
An important ‘making work pay’ policy in the UK is the Working Families Tax
Credit (WFTC). This program, which was introduced in 1999, provides support for
low wage working families. An important difference with the EITC is that the WFTC
has a minimum weekly hours eligibility condition.4 At the introduction of the less
generous predecessor of the WFTC (the Family Credit), the minimum hours cut-off
was set at 24 h. In 1992, this was reduced to 16 h, and this encouraged a significant
fraction of inactive single mothers into work (Blundell and Hoynes 2004). At the
introduction of the WFTC in 1999, financial incentives increased, particularly for
single mothers with young children. Among others, Brewer et al. (2007) find that the
WFTC induced single mothers to increase their participation in the labor market by
5 % points.
For the Netherlands, Bettendorf et al. (2014) studied the extension of an earned
income tax credit for mothers with their youngest child between 12 and 15 years.
They find a negligible effect on the labor force participation and argue that this is
probably because they use as the control group single mothers with children younger
than 12 or older than 15 years of age. When they use as control group single women
without children as is done in most related studies, they also find a positive effect of
the financial incentive. In the case of Bettendorf et al. (2014), single women without
children are an invalid control group, which is in line with the critique of Blundell
and Macurdy (1999) and Meghir and Philips (2010). In our paper, we will therefore
also use single mothers as a control group, instead of single women without children.
Financial incentives were also investigated in Canada and Australia. In Canada,
the self-sufficiency project experimented with a generous time-limited earnings sup-
plement available to single parents who had been on welfare for at least a year, and
who subsequently left welfare and found full-time work (defined as at least 30 h a
week). Results show positive effects in the short run (Michalopoulos et al. 2005), but
temporary wage subsidies did not have a long run effect on wages and welfare par-
ticipation (Card and Hyslop 2005). In Australia, policy shifts implemented in 1987,
2004, and 2006–2007 increased employment of single mothers (Doiron 2004; Gong
and Breunig 2014). Working hours were not always increased.
Reemployment bonuses create direct financial incentives to find and accept a
job. On the basis of outcomes from four US cash bonus experiments and six job
search experiments, Meyer (1995) concludes that economic incentives affect the
speed by which unemployed workers leave the unemployment insurance rolls. Nev-
ertheless, empirical studies on reemployment bonuses usually show modest effects
on the behavior of the unemployed workers who could benefit from such bonuses
(see Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987; Anderson 1992; Decker and O’Leary 1995;
O’Leary et al. 2005; Van der Klaauw and van Ours 2013).
Several US studies report that welfare reforms had a greater effect on black sin-
gle mother’s employment than on white single mother’s employment (among others,
McKernan et al. 2000; O’Neill and Hill 2001; Noonan et al. 2007). This differential
4A description and comparison of the EITC and WFTC program can be found in Brewer (2001).
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impact is attributed especially to differences in educational attainment among black
and white immigrants and to different familial circumstances. Black single moth-
ers are more often never married. This increases their economic vulnerability, which
may make them more open to work requirements. However, even after controlling
for these differences, Noonan et al. (2007) found that changes in welfare policies and
labor market conditions affected black single mothers’ employment more than white
single mothers’ employment.
Our paper investigates policies to increase the labor force participation of single
mothers on welfare. We present the results of a policy experiment for single mother
welfare recipients in the Netherlands. Previous studies on financial incentives for sin-
gle mothers’ welfare recipients have been focusing on the USA and the UK, which
are both countries with relatively low benefits. The Dutch labor market is interesting
to study as it is a representative of countries with high benefits and low incentives
for single mothers to make a transition from welfare to work. Until 2009, Dutch sin-
gle mothers on welfare had no financial incentives to work in small part-time jobs.
When a single mother started to earn money, her welfare benefits were reduced one
for one. Therefore, she was financially tempted to enter the labor market only if she
could earn at least the amount of the welfare benefit. However, single mothers on
welfare are often low skilled and therefore have a low earnings capacity. A mini-
mum wage single mother can only escape welfare when she works at least about
30 h per week. This is a difficult task in combination with childcare responsibilities
and is often not in accordance with the assumptions of these mothers about moth-
erhood. The Dutch government intended to make work financially more attractive,
decrease welfare expenditures, and possibly reduce poverty among single mothers.
The policy did not aim for single mothers to leave welfare completely, a part-time job
would suffice. A policy experiment was set-up to explore the potential of two pol-
icy measures; an earnings disregard and direct job creation. As we will describe in
more detail below, the earnings disregard was introduced to persuade single mothers
to accept part-time jobs, while remaining on welfare. The experiment took place in
2009 and 2010 and was focused on single mothers on welfare with at least one child
younger than 12 years. In the experiment, 14 Dutch municipalities implemented the
earnings disregard while 6 of them also implemented direct job creation. Our paper
evaluates the instruments using a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach in
which we simultaneously compare (1) the period before and during the experiment,
(2) the municipalities with and without the experimental policy instruments, and (3)
single mothers with at least one child younger than 12 years and single mothers with
all children 12 years and older. Furthermore, because of the difference in labor market
situation, we make a distinction between native and immigrant single mothers.
There have been quite a few papers on welfare and the labor supply of single
mothers with young children. We have a threefold contribution to this literature. First,
unlike many studies who use single women without children as control group, we
have as control group single mothers with older children. Second, we are able to study
for the same group of individuals the separate effects of two policy instruments, a
financial incentive through the earnings disregard and a job opportunity through job
creation. Third, we study the policy measures on welfare recipients in a country with
a relatively generous benefit system. Note that the Netherlands is not representative
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for other countries when considering the widespread use of part-time work.5 When
single mothers in the Netherlands have a larger flexibility in choosing the number
of working hours, the estimates in this study may provide an upper bound for the
potential effects in other countries.
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we investigate the total effect
of the policy experiments. Then, we proceed by investigating the distinct effects of
the earnings disregard and of job creation on top of the earnings disregard. Finally, as
in Blundell et al. (2009), we make a distinction between two types of treated single
mothers depending on the age of their youngest child. Since the compulsory edu-
cation requirement for children starts at the age of 5, we distinguish single mothers
with the youngest child in the age category 0–4 years from those with the youngest
child 5–11 years. Our main finding is that for immigrant single mothers, there was a
positive employment effect of an earnings disregard. Job creation increased working
hours for immigrant single mothers with the youngest child between the age of 5 and
11 and for native single mothers. Although the outflow from welfare is not affected,
welfare expenditures go down. For native single mothers, we find smaller treatment
effects than for immigrant single mothers.
The set-up of our paper is as follows. Section 2 shortly explains the Dutch wel-
fare system and describes the policy experiment. Section 3 describes the data and
Section 4 presents some exploratory analysis. The empirical analysis is presented in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Policy experiment
2.1 Welfare benefits in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, welfare benefits guarantee a minimum income for all unem-
ployed or part-time employed workers. Welfare benefits are means-tested and a single
mother can only qualify if she does not have sufficient earnings, alimony, or other
benefits, like unemployment insurance benefits or disability insurance benefits. Wel-
fare recipients have to comply with job search requirements. Furthermore, eligibility
for welfare depends on wealth. Single renters may own at most 5.5 thousand euro
and homeowners only qualify for welfare when they own not more than 46 thousand
euro. Welfare benefit levels are set by the central government in January and July of
each year. During the experiment, the welfare benefit level net of taxes was about
C900 for single mothers between the age of 21 and 65 and C480 for single mothers
younger than 21. In addition, people may receive allowances up to some maximum
amounts. Welfare benefits are provided by municipalities.
At the start of the experiment, about 300,000 individuals in the Netherlands
received welfare benefits (about 2.7 % of all persons between the age of 15 and 65).
Of these, a substantial 26 % were lone parents, predominantly single mothers. About
5The average annual hours actually worked per worker in the Netherlands was 1384 in 2009, compared to
an OECD average of 1766.
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10.6 % of all single parents depend on welfare (Statistics Netherlands 2011). This
makes single mothers an important group to investigate.
2.2 Set-up of the experiment
The goal of the experiment was to increase the labor force participation of sin-
gle mothers on welfare and reduce welfare expenditures. Since for this group it is
particularly difficult to leave welfare, the experiment was focused on encouraging
part-time work while still receiving welfare benefits. Two policy instruments were
introduced, an earnings disregard of C4 for each hour worked, up to C120 net per
month and direct job creation in the public and private sector. These instruments were
not designed to achieve outflow from welfare in the short run but to increase work
experience which might make it easier for single mothers to find a full-time job later
on in life. Therefore, a part-time job would suffice.
The first policy instrument, the earnings disregard, encouraged single mothers to
participate in paid employment by allowing them to earn income while they were
receiving financial assistance. In the experiment, C4 per hour worked were exempted
as income when determining the monthly welfare benefits. So, for every hour that
a single mother worked, she received C4, up to a maximum of C120 per month.6
Without this instrument, welfare benefits would have been reduced by the full amount
of the earnings.7 Single mothers on welfare who were already participating in the
labor market before the start of the experiment were also eligible for the earnings
disregard during the treatment period. Therefore, there was no reason to postpone
labor force participation and we do not have to worry about anticipation effects. The
aim of the earnings disregard was to increase labor force participation if only through
a part-time job. By entering the labor market on a part-time basis, the women might
find it easier to expand their working hours later on in life.
Figure 1 illustrates how in a labor supply framework, the earnings disregard affects
financial incentives in case a single mother could earn the hourly minimum wage of
(approximately) C7.50 and receives welfare benefits of C225 per week. In this sit-
uation, a minimum wage job of 30 h per week would generate the same income as
welfare benefits would. The budget constraint for a welfare recipient is BCA and
maximum utility would be derived at point B, where the welfare recipient does not
participate in the labor market. If an earnings disregard is introduced, the new budget
constraint is BDECA.8 The maximum earnings disregard on a weekly basis would be
6As a point of reference, in January 2011, the gross legal minimum wage was C1424 per month, for
employees as from the age of 23 who worked full-time (36, 38, or 40 hours per week, depending on the
sector of employment). This means a net wage of about C1150 and a net hourly wage of about C7.50. The
experiment could increase the income of single mothers on welfare by about 13 % (120/900).
7Due to decentralization, municipalities may apply different policies to bring people on welfare back to
work. An earnings disregard in this form, however, had no legal basis. This was only allowed for the
treatment group in the treatment municipalities during the treatment period.
8Figure 1 does not take into account the possible costs of formal child care. However, when single mothers
on welfare use formal child care to be able to work, they receive a generous subsidy from the tax authority
and the municipality.
How to stimulate single mothers on welfare to find a job 1031
Fig. 1 Budget constraint with and without earnings disregard
after 7.5 h at point D. Figure 1 indicates that a welfare recipient might reach a higher
utility in point D or perhaps slightly right of point D. It does not seem very likely that
the welfare recipient would find a full-time job more attractive because of the earn-
ings disregard. However, this was not the main aim of the experiment. In the example
of a minimum wage earner, there is even a disincentive to work between 30 and 34 h
per week because in that case the single mother looses her welfare benefits and her
income drops. So, for some single mothers, the outflow from welfare may dimin-
ish because of the design of the experiment. Because the earnings disregard makes it
more attractive to be on welfare, the experiment may encourage single mothers with
young children to enter welfare. In the analysis below, we explore whether such an
entitlement effect exists.
The second policy instrument is direct job creation in the public and private sector
through a so called ‘labor pool.’ Municipalities act as ‘clearing houses’ for employers
and job-seekers and create new jobs for at least 12 h a week for regular employers
or for the municipality itself. To hire a single mother with a low earnings capacity,
municipalities may provide a subsidy to an employer. Those who obtained a job
through the job creation scheme were also eligible for the earnings disregard. When
analyzing direct job creation, we analyze an intention to treat, since the results are
based on the initial treatment assignment and not on the treatment effect for people
who actually took the treatment and participated in the labor pool. The intention-to-
treat effect does not suffer from a nonrandom assignment of jobs to single mothers
eligible for direct job creation. Also, using an intent-to-treat analysis, we analyze
how direct job creation works in a realistic context, which explicitly acknowledges
the success or failure that municipalities experience in finding jobs for single mothers
on welfare. A disadvantage of the intent-to-treat design is that we may underestimate
the potential effectiveness of job creation, for example, in case municipalities do not
succeed in finding jobs for single mothers on welfare.
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Fourteen Dutch municipalities participated in the experiment (the treatment
municipalities).9 Municipalities were not forced to participate in the experiment.
Instead, municipalities got the opportunity to apply for the experiment and if they
participated they had to implement the instruments, for which they received a finan-
cial compensation. The advantage of voluntary participation is that the participating
municipalities were capable to implement the instruments and deliver data that are
needed to evaluate the experiment. A possible drawback of voluntary participation
is that a selection bias is introduced if in particular motivated municipalities partic-
ipate, who already bring single mother welfare recipients back to work quickly. It
could also be that participating municipalities have relatively underprivileged single
mothers. By using a triple difference approach, we correct for a priori differences
between treatment and control municipalities. We will see later that observed char-
acteristics of single mothers in the treatment and control municipalities are about the
same and that the growth rates of the inflow into welfare are similar in treatment and
control municipalities. Furthermore, we find that before the experiment, job finding
rates and the outflow from welfare were similar in treatment and control municipali-
ties. Replacing the treatment municipalities by placebo treatment municipalities lead
on average to insignificant results.
All of the treatment municipalities applied the earnings disregard to the treatment
group, i.e., all single mothers on welfare with a least one child below the age of
12. Six of these 14 municipalities also applied direct job creation. We exploit this
variation to identify the effect of direct job creation on top of the earnings disregard.10
The control group consists of single mothers with children between the age of 12
and 18 while all other Dutch municipalities form the control municipalities.11 In the
robustness checks, we will narrow the sample around the age eligibility threshold of
12. The earnings disregard was announced and implemented at the start of the year
9These are Almere, Bodegraven, Breda, Echt-Susteren, Enschede, Groningen, Heerenveen, Nijmegen,
Reiderland, Schiedam, Scheemda, Vlaardingen, Winschoten, and Zwolle.
10During the period of analysis, also reemployment bonuses were introduced in the treatment municipal-
ities. Single mothers on welfare could receive a reemployment bonus of C500 when they left welfare for
at least 6 months because of working enough hours in the labor market to be financially independent. In
some municipalities, reemployment bonuses were already implemented before the experiment and part of
the municipalities that did not participate in the policy experiment also provided reemployment bonuses.
We have no information about which control municipalities provided reemployment bonuses and therefore
we cannot identify the effect of the reemployment bonus using the difference-in-differences approach. In
general, when reemployment bonuses are part of the municipal policy, they hold for all individuals in wel-
fare, regardless of having a (young) child. Our triple differences analysis takes the effects of these bonuses
into account by analyzing differences between the treatment and control group in treatment municipalities
and correcting for overall differences between treatment and control municipalities. Therefore, we are not
worried that the reemployment bonuses affect our results seriously. In the estimation, we correct for the
fact that in some treatment municipalities single mothers on welfare (including the control group) were
entitled to a reemployment bonus and that in some treatment municipalities single mothers on welfare
(including the treatment group) were already entitled to a reemployment bonus in the control period.
11On January 1, 2009, the Netherlands had 441 municipalities. The results hardly change when we leave
out the four largest municipalities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht).
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2009 in all treatment municipalities. No announcements were made before the start
of the experiment. The implementation of direct job creation took somewhat longer
and started in January 2010 for most of the municipalities (in the estimation, we take
into account timing differences across municipalities). The experiment ended at the
end of December 2010. We have also data of the years 2005–2008 available, which
form the control period.
The treatment municipalities are of different size and are geographically spread
through the Netherlands. It is possible that single mothers selected themselves into
treatment municipalities. However, this is not very likely since single mothers did not
know in advance which municipalities would participate in the experiment. And, we
observe no movements of welfare recipients to treatment municipalities.
During the control and the treatment period, other policy changes were imple-
mented that affected single mothers with young children. Childcare subsidies were
increased for parents with a youngest child up to 12 years old (see Fig. 2 in Bettendorf
et al. 2015). However, since the subsidy rates remained rather constant for low-
income parents, this reform seems not relevant for mothers on welfare. The earned
income tax credit (EITC) for single parents was also increased between 2005 and
2009 (see Fig. 3 in Bettendorf et al. 2015). The change in the credits was mostly
targeted at middle- and high-income earners, like the change in childcare subsidies.
As far as changes in the EITC and childcare subsidies did have an effect on moth-
ers on welfare, our triple differences analysis takes the effects of these reforms into
account by correcting for differences between the treatment and control group in
control municipalities.
A final concern is that increased labor market participation of the treatment group
would crowd out participation of single mothers in the control group. Then, we would
overestimate the effect of the instruments. However, since single mothers are only
a small group in the total population of job seekers, we do not consider this to be
problematic.12
3 Data
Our data are from the 2005–2010 statistics on welfare benefits (BUS, Bijstand-
suitkeringenstatistiek, CBS 2010a) gathered by Statistics Netherlands. The BUS
is an administrative dataset that contains all welfare recipients in the Netherlands
and provides information about gender, age, the cause of the welfare benefits,
whether welfare recipients receive income from other resources (like labor income or
alimony), the amount of welfare benefits that they receive, and whether or not they
are a homeowner. We also have information about the number of children, age of the
12As mentioned before, single mothers (treatment + control group) comprise about 25 % of all welfare
recipients.












2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
year
Treatment municipalities, treatment group
Treatment municipalities, control group
Control municipalities, treatment group
Control municipalities, control group
Fig. 2 Yearly inflow of single mothers in welfare (start of new spells); 2005 is the base year. Treatment
municipality = municipality that implemented the instruments; control municipality = all other Dutch
municipalities; treatment group = single mothers with children younger than 12 years; control group =
single mothers with all children 12 years or older
children, marital status, and the ethnicity for all welfare recipients between 2005 and
2010 based on the population register.
In this study, we select all Dutch municipalities except Amsterdam and Langedijk.
Amsterdam and Langedijk participated in the experiment, but the implementation of
the experimental instruments failed in these municipalities, such that they did not
provide reliable information about the effects of the instruments. Furthermore, we
select all single mothers that flowed into welfare as from January 1, 2005. Figure 2
shows the yearly inflow of single mothers in welfare for the treatment group and
the control group in the treatment and control municipalities. Clearly, there are
differences between the treatment and control group, but within these groups, the
differences between treatment and control municipalities are small. For the control
group relatively, a lot of welfare spells started in 2009 and 2010, probably as a result
of the financial and economic crisis. The number of new spells in the treatment group
declined a bit between 2005 and 2008, but increased thereafter. Note that the growth
rate in 2009 and 2010 is about the same for the treatment and control municipalities.
This indicates that the experiment has not attracted more single mothers with young
children into welfare.13
13When we regress the growth rates of the treatment group for the control and treatment municipalities
on year dummies, an indicator for the treatment municipalities and interaction terms of the indicator and
the year dummies we find no significant difference in the growth rates between treatment and control
municipalities.
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Table 1 Number of welfare spells per single mother
Treatment municipality Control municipality
Treatment group Control group Treatment group Control group Total
# Spells Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
1 5584 86.3 854 88.4 41,288 85.6 6650 90.3 54,376 86.2
2 767 11.9 96 9.9 6206 12.9 650 8.8 7719 12.2
3 107 1.7 13 1.4 680 1.4 61 0.8 861 1.4
4 12 0.2 3 0.3 72 0.2 6 0.1 93 0.1
5 3 0.1 0 0 5 0.0 1 0.0 9 0.0
Total mothers 6473 100 966 100 48,251 100 7368 100 63,058 100
Total spells 7502 1097 56,053 8162 72,814
Treatment municipality = municipality that implemented the instruments; control municipality = all other
Dutch municipalities; treatment group = single mothers with children younger than 12 years; control
group = single mothers with all children 12 years or older. Single mothers are classified into the category
of their first welfare spell
Table 1 shows the number of spells we observe for each single mother in the
treatment and control group. In total, we observe 72,814 welfare spells for 63,058
single mothers. About 12 % of the welfare spells are from a treatment municipal-
ity and the treatment group is about six times larger than the control group. For
most of the single mothers (86 %), we just observe one spell, for 12 % of the single
mothers we observe two spells, and for the remaining 2 % we observe three spells
or more.
The characteristics of the single mothers on welfare are presented in Table 2,
where we compare the treatment and the control group, for the treatment and
control municipalities, and for the treatment and control period. The descriptives
show that the average age of the single mothers is 34 in the treatment group and 41
in the control group (most single mothers are aged between 20 and 53 years). On
average, single mothers in the treatment group have 1.9 children and in the control
group 1.7. The youngest child is on average 4.4 years old in the treatment group,
and 13.9 years old in the control group. The treatment group consists of a lot of
unmarried single mothers, while the control group has relatively more divorced moth-
ers. Between 2005–2008 and 2009–2010, the number of divorced single mothers
increased, while the number of married mothers decreased. However, all mothers that
we study are living alone. A relative large share of 32 % of the single mothers is first
generation non-western immigrant. Labor force participation is more than 20 % and
is somewhat lower in the treatment municipalities than in the control municipalities.
Alimonies are received by 16 % of the single mothers and the share of homeowners
is low (3.3 %).
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4 Exploratory analysis
To establish the effectiveness of the policy instruments, we observe five variables of
interest. Two of them relate to durations, i.e., the duration from the start of the welfare
spell to the acceptance of a part-time job while still remaining in welfare and the dura-
tion from the start of the welfare spell until outflow from welfare occurs. The other
three variables of interest are financial variables, i.e., earnings received by the sin-
gle mothers, welfare benefits paid by the municipalities, and the sum of earnings and
welfare benefits. The variables of interest are only defined for welfare recipients. We
do not have data about all single mothers in the Netherlands and this would be a prob-
lem when the decision to take up welfare is a function of benefit generosity. However,
as discussed before, Fig. 2 strongly suggests that the experiment did not attract more
single mothers with young children into welfare. In the remainder of this section,
we explore the variables of interest, where we separately consider immigrant sin-
gle mothers which we define as non-Western immigrants and native single mothers
which we define as native Dutch or Western immigrants.14 Immigrant single mothers
may have language difficulties and may be influenced by their home-country culture
regarding the upbringing of children (Fernandez 2007; Kok et al. 2011). This may
influence their labor force participation and their response to the policy instruments.
Furthermore, compared to natives, immigrant single mothers relatively often bring up
their children alone as from birth, i.e., without the help of a father, a grandmother, or
a grandfather. By way of exploratory analysis, we consider the total treatment effect
by comparing the treatment group to the control group, treatment municipalities
to control municipalities, and the treatment period to the control period. In the
exploratory analysis, we investigate the total effect of the earnings disregard and
direct job creation and we ignore the potential heterogeneity of the treatment
group.
4.1 Duration indicators
The earnings disregard and direct job creation may increase the inflow of single
mothers to a part-time job. The solid lines in Fig. 3a, b present the inflow to part-time
work for immigrant single mothers in the treatment and the control group. At t = 0,
a welfare spell starts and the graphs show the share of immigrant single mothers that
started a part-time job over the duration of their welfare benefit spell.
The two thin solid lines in Fig. 3a show that in the control period, the inflow into
part-time work was about the same in treatment and control municipalities. This sug-
gests that the treatment and control municipalities were comparable before the start
of the experiment. Within 730 days after the start of a welfare spell, almost 20 %
of the single mothers started part-time work. The thin and thick grey solid lines in
Fig. 3a show that in the control municipalities the inflow to part-time work is lower
in the treatment period than in the control period (probably related to the slowdown
in economic activity due to the Great Recession). This decline is represented by the
1483 % of the group defined as ‘native’ is born in the Netherlands.
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first difference (grey dashed line), which lies below zero because of the negative dif-
ference between the treatment and control period. Meanwhile, despite the economic
crisis, the inflow into part-time jobs increased for the treatment municipalities (the
thin and thick black solid lines). This can also be seen by the positive first difference
(the black dashed line). Since we have no reason to assume that single mothers in
the treatment municipalities are not influenced by the crisis, this indicates a positive
effect of the experiment on the inflow to part-time work.
Figure 3b shows the same graph for the control group. As expected, because
of the economic crisis, we find that the inflow to part-time work declined in both
(a)  Treatment group (immigrants) (b)  Control group (immigrants)
Double and triple differences
(c)  Treatment effect (immigrants) (d)  Treatment effect (natives)
Inflow curves and first differences 
Fig. 3 Share of single mothers that start working in combination with welfare. Panels a, b show graphs
for the inflow into part-time work while receiving welfare. At t = 0, a welfare spell starts and the graphs
show the share of single mothers that started working over the duration of their welfare benefit spell. In
addition, a, b show first differences, that present the increase or decrease in the share of single mothers that
started working between the treatment and control period, for the treatment group and the control group in
the treatment municipalities and control municipalities. Panels c, d present double and triple differences.
The double differences show us to what degree the increase in the inflow to work was higher in the
treatment than the the control group. Finally, we correct the double difference estimates of the treatment
municipalities for the double differences found in the control municipalities. This leads to triple difference
estimates of the treatment effects
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treatment and control municipalities. This results in negative first differences (the
dashed lines are below zero). In Fig. 3c, we plot the double differences—between the
treatment period and the control period and between the treatment group and the con-
trol group—for the control municipalities and for the treatment municipalities. For
example, the black solid line in Fig. 3c, that represents the double difference (dif2) of
the treatment municipalities, shows the difference between the black dashed lines in
Fig. 3a, b. This line illustrates that in the treatment municipalities, the increase in the
inflow to part-time work within 2 years after the start of the welfare benefit was 23 %
higher in the treatment than in the control group. The line that represents the double
difference of the control municipalities is almost zero (the solid grey line), indicat-
ing that there are no large differences between the treatment and the control group in
the control municipalities. The triple differences, computed by taking the difference
between the two double differences, is clearly positive indicating a positive treatment
effect. Using the triple difference approach, we take into account that the business
cycle may have had a different effect on the treatment and the control group, and we
exclude the possibility that the results are the consequences of municipality-specific
developments (e.g., that treatment municipalities are less affected by the crisis than
control municipalities).
Figure 3d presents the triple differences for natives and shows that there is hardly
any treatment effect.15 When interpreting the graphs in Fig. 3, we have to take into
account that not all single mothers received the treatment as from the start of their
welfare spell. In addition, the sample becomes more and more selective over the wel-
fare duration with regard to observed and unobserved characteristics. In the empirical
analysis below, we will take this into account.
Panel a of Table 3 is set-up in the same way as Fig. 3. It collects the results of the
graphs in Fig. 3 after a welfare spell of 2 years and shows how the triple difference
estimates of the treatment effect after a welfare spell of 2 years can be calculated. The
left part of panel a is about immigrant single mothers. In the control municipalities,
there is almost no difference between the evolution of the treatment group and control
group in the share of single mothers finding a part-time job within 2 years. The double
difference is equal to 0.04. For the treatment municipalities, there is a substantial
difference. Whereas the control group faces a decline of 0.19, the treatment group
faces an increase of 0.04, leading to a double difference of 0.23. In combination
with the double difference for the control municipalities of 0.04, this leads to a triple
difference of 0.19, i.e., a triple difference of 19 percentage-points (this is also what
we see in Fig. 3c after 2 years). The right-hand side part of Table 3a shows that for
native single mothers the triple difference estimates of the treatment effects are small.
Here, the triple difference is only −0.01.
The second duration indicator from which the effectiveness of the treatment may
be derived is the duration of the welfare spell. In the long run, the policy instru-
ments may strengthen mother’s labor force attachment and increase their probability
15Inflow curves and first differences for native single mothers can be found in Fig. 6 of Appendix A.
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Table 3 Treatment effects—exploratory analysis
Immigrants Natives
Treatment Control Treatment Control
group group  group group 
a. Part-time work after 2 years in welfare
Treatment Treatment period 0.23 0.14 0.28 0.29
municipality Control period 0.19 0.33 0.34 0.36
 0.04 −0.19 0.23 −0.06 −0.07 0.01
Control Treatment period 0.14 0.19 0.28 0.28
municipality Control period 0.18 0.27 0.34 0.36
 −0.04 −0.08 0.04 −0.06 −0.08 0.02
 0.19 −0.01
b. Outflow from welfare after 2 years in welfare
Treatment Treatment period 0.41 0.40 0.49 0.49
municipality Control period 0.54 0.69 0.60 0.75
 −0.13 −0.29 0.16 −0.11 −0.26 0.15
Control Treatment period 0.41 0.42 0.48 0.49
municipality Control period 0.50 0.65 0.61 0.72
 −0.09 −0.23 0.14 −0.13 −0.23 0.10
 0.02 0.05
c. Earnings
Treatment Treatment period 197.1 212.3 307.1 364.0
municipality Control period 204.1 286.0 340.9 420.1
 −7.0 −73.7 66.7 −33.8 −56.1 22.3
Control Treatment period 185.1 240.5 343.8 390.8
municipality Control period 212.9 293.9 361.8 422.8
 −27.8 −53.4 25.6 −18.0 −32.0 14.0
 41.1 8.3
d. Welfare benefits
Treatment Treatment period 945.4 933.3 881.1 814.6
municipality Control period 915.8 834.9 848.8 743.6
 29.6 98.4 −68.8 32.3 71.0 −38.7
Control Treatment period 953.3 912.5 840.4 790.9
municipality Control period 912.9 833.8 792.5 713.3
 40.4 78.7 −38.3 47.9 77.6 −29.7
 −30.5 −9.0
e. Earnings + Welfare Benefits
Treatment Treatment period 1142.5 1145.6 1188.2 1178.7
municipality Control period 1119.8 1120.9 1189.6 1163.7
 22.7 24.7 −2.0 −1.4 15.0 −16.4
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Table 3 (continued)
Immigrants Natives
Treatment Control Treatment Control
group group  group group 
Control Treatment period 1138.4 1153.0 1184.2 1181.7
municipality Control period 1125.8 1127.7 1154.3 1136.1
 12.6 25.3 −12.7 29.9 45.6 −15.7
 10.7 −0.7
This table provides an indication of the treatment effect using a triple difference approach; = first differ-
ence;  = Difference in differences;  = Triple difference. Treatment municipality = municipality
that implemented the new policy; control municipality = all other Dutch municipalities; treatment group
= single mothers with children younger than 12 years; control group = single mothers with all children
12 years or older. Earnings and welfare benefits in C per month
to flow out of welfare. However, in the short run, direct job creation may have a lock-
in effect and this may reduce the probability to flow out of welfare. The earnings
disregard may also be so attractive that outflow from welfare becomes less attrac-
tive. To investigate this, we test whether the total outflow from welfare is reduced by
the experiment.16 Figure 4a shows that during the control period, 31 % of the single
mothers in the treatment group left welfare within 1 year after the start of a welfare
spell. After 2 years, this was 54 %, and after 3 years, this was about 63 %. Just as
in Fig. 3, we compute first, double, and triple differences. Figure 4c shows that the
triple differences are small indicating a small treatment effect. Figure 4d shows that
by and large the triple difference results for natives are very much the same. Outflow
curves and first differences for natives can again be found in Appendix A.
Panel b of Table 3 collects the results of the graphs in Fig. 4 and shows us triple
difference estimates of the treatment effects after 2 years in welfare. The treatment
effect is 2 % points for immigrants and 5 % points for natives. The treatment effects
are small or perhaps even absent. Apparently, the total outflow from welfare is not
reduced by the experiment.
4.2 Financial indicators
The remaining three indicators of the success of the treatment relate to financial vari-
ables. By investigating labor earnings, we examine whether the instruments increased
the inflow to part-time work and/or whether they increased the number of working
hours. Furthermore, we evaluate whether the instruments reduced the welfare bene-
fits paid by the municipalities and whether the instruments reduced poverty among
single mothers and their children.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of income from sources other than welfare dur-
ing the experiment. Mostly, these are earnings, alimonies from ex-partners, and tax
16Outflow may take place because of finding a job or because of other reasons, such as finding a partner.
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(a) Treatment group (immigrants) (b) Control group (immigrants)
Double and triple differences
(c)  Treatment effect (immigrants) (d)  Treatment effect (natives)
Outflow curves and first differences
Fig. 4 Outflow from welfare. Panels a, b show graphs for the outflow from welfare. At t = 0, a welfare
spell starts and the graphs show the share of single mothers that left welfare over the duration of their
welfare benefit spell. See note of Fig. 3 for an explanation of first, double and triple differences
reductions. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish earnings from other income that
single mothers receive in addition to welfare. However, using the difference-in-
differences approach, we can reasonably assume that other income, like alimonies,
are not influenced by the experiment and in the remainder of this paper we will
therefore define income from others sources as earnings. When income from other
resources than welfare exceed the welfare benefit level, people have to leave welfare.
Extreme income levels in Fig. 5 are probably related to post-payments.17
Panel c of Table 3 indicates that earnings increased as a result of the policy
instruments, using the same triple difference set-up as before. For immigrant single
mothers, the triple difference estimate of the treatment effect on earnings is C41 per
17For example, a single mother did not receive her alimony some months and now she receives a back pay
of the alimonies from the last months at once.
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Fig. 5 Distribution of ‘income from other sources’
month, while for native single mothers it is C8 per month. Panel d of Table 3 shows
that for immigrant single mothers, welfare benefits on average went down with about
C30 per month because of the experiment. For native single mothers, this was only
C9 per month. Finally, panel e shows that the net benefits for the single mothers are




In addition to the exploratory analysis, we present model estimates that take into
account background characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity. In this way, we
allow for changing compositions of the treated and non-treated single mothers that
may affect the outcome variables. To identify the effect of the experiment, we use
three dimensions, (1) we compare the treatment and the control group, (2) we com-
pare treatment and control municipalities, and (3) we compare the treatment period
2009–2010 and the control period 2005–2008. We combine these dimensions using
the difference-in-difference-in-differences approach.18
The advantage of the triple difference approach compared to the double differ-
ence approach is twofold. First, when developments are different for the treatment
and the control group for other reasons than the policy experiment, we take this into
account by comparing the developments in the control municipalities. Second, when
developments are different for the treatment and control municipalities because of
other reasons than the policy experiment, we take this into account by comparing the
18This approach is, among others, also used by Gruber (1994), Hamermesh and Trejo (2000), and
Campolieti (2004).
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control group in the treatment and control municipalities. Using the triple difference
approach, we assume that there is no contemporaneous shock that affects the relative
outcomes of the treatment group in the treatment municipalities during the treatment
period. Furthermore, we assume that developments for the control group and devel-
opments for the treatment group in the control municipalities are not influenced by
the experiment. Figures 3a and 4a show that before the experiment, inflow into a
part-time job and outflow from welfare were very comparable in the treatment and
control municipalities. To test the validity of the results, Section 5.5 also discusses
the outcomes of tests in which we use placebo treatment years and placebo treatment
municipalities.
The determinants of the inflow into part-time work and the outflow from welfare
are established using a hazard rate model in which the transition rate of individual i
at duration t conditional on observed characteristics X, unobserved characteristics u
and treatment variables function Dγ is specified as follows:
θ(t |Xit ,Dit , ui) = uiλ(t) exp(Xitβ + Ditγ ) (1)
where β is a parameter vector and λ(t) a piecewise constant function representing the
pattern of duration dependence. We assume unobserved heterogeneity u to follow a
Gamma distribution with variance α.
The vector X contains control variables such as the age of the single mother,
the age of the youngest child, the number of children, marital status, the cause
of the welfare benefits, whether the single mother receives alimony, and whether
the single mother is a homeowner. In addition, X contains year dummies, dum-
mies for the treatment municipalities, and dummy variables to correct for the
presence of a reemployment bonus in some treatment municipalities.19 The vector
X also contains time-varying covariates. For example, if during a welfare spell a
child is born, the number of children increases and the age of the youngest child
goes down.
The treatment variables function Dγ is specified as follows:
Ditγ = γ1Git + γ2Tt + γ3Mi · Git + γ4Mi · Tt + γ5Git · Tt + δGit · Mi · Tt (2)
where G represent a dummy variable for the treatment group, M a dummy variable
for the treatment municipalities, and T a dummy variable for the treatment period
(T ). Sometimes, treatments started at different moments in time (e.g., direct job cre-
ation started at different moments in time across municipalities). We do not include
M as a separate variable, because all treatment municipality dummies are already
included in X. Also note that G is a time-varying variable as a single mother may
19Unfortunately, we do not have information about reemployment bonuses in control municipalities. How-
ever, for all treatment municipalities, we know whether and in which years they provided reemployment
bonuses to the control group and the treatment group. To correct for this, we include interactions of year
and the provision of a reemployment bonus (yes = 1, no = 0). In addition, we allow these effects to be dif-
ferent for the treatment and the control group, and later on within the treatment group for single mothers
with the youngest child younger or older than 5.
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switch from control group to treatment groups due to the introduction of the new pol-
icy or may switch from treatment group to control group because of the fact that her
youngest child turns 12 years of age.20 The main parameter of interest in Eq. 2 is δ,
which represents the treatment effect based on the triple-difference approach.
The first parameter, γ1, captures the differences between the treatment and the
control group (identification comes from the control period and the control munic-
ipalities). The second parameter, γ2, captures the difference between the treatment
period and the control period (identification comes from the control group and the
control municipalities). Parameter γ3 captures the possible differences between the
treatment groups in the municipalities that did and did not implement the instruments
(identification comes from the control period). The period effect may be different
for the treatment and control municipalities, which is captured by the fourth parame-
ter (γ4). Parameter γ5 represents the interaction between the treatment group and the
treatment period.
The determinants of earnings yit that single mother i receives in time period t in
addition to her welfare benefit is established using a linear regression model of the
form yit = Xitρ + Ditκ + εit (3)
where Xit and Dit are specified before. In the same way, welfare benefits per recip-
ient, paid by the municipalities, and income are modeled using linear regression
models.
By computing clustered standard errors at the municipality level, we take into
account error correlation within municipalities. Clustering standard errors at the
municipality level is important, especially because the variable of interest is mea-
sured at the level of the municipality (e.g., Moulton 1986). Furthermore, among
others, Bertrand et al. (2004) suggest that it is crucial to allow for the presence of
serial correlation. In this paper, we allow for the presence of any correlation pattern
within municipalities by using clustered standard errors. Clustered standard errors at
the municipality level are used in Eqs. 1 and 3. To compute clustered standard errors
in Eq. 1, we use a bootstrap procedure.21
5.2 Parameter estimates
We present the results of our empirical analysis in three steps. In this section, we
present the overall effectiveness of the policy instruments. In Section 5.3, we inves-
tigate the effect of the earnings disregard and job creation separately. In Section 5.4,
we investigate whether the treatment effects differ within the treatment group, mak-
ing a distinction between single mothers with very young children aged 0 to 4 and
single mothers with older children aged 5 to 11.
20Nevertheless, results hardly change when we exclude the 177 untreated single mothers who are untreated
because their children passed the age of 12 during the treatment period.
21In this procedure, we draw municipalities with replacement. For each bootstrap repetition, we store the
estimation results and once all repetitions have been computed we calculate the standard errors of the
stored model estimates.
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Table 4 shows the estimated total treatment effects. Panel I of Table 4 shows the
parameters estimates of the treatment. The full parameter estimates are presented in
appendix Tables 9 and 10.22 To improve the interpretation of the treatment effects,
panel II of Table 4 presents average adjusted predictions and average marginal
effects. The average adjusted predictions show the average probability of part-time
employment and outflow within 2 years23 after the start of a welfare spell, in case all
treated single mothers who entered welfare during the experiment would (or would
not) have received the treatment. The difference gives us the average marginal effect
of the treatment. For the standard errors in Ia, Ib, and II, we used 250 bootstrap
replications.24
As shown in panel Ia and IIa of Table 4, the treatment increased the inflow rate
to a part-time job for immigrant single mothers significantly. The inflow to part-time
work within 2 years after the start of a welfare spell increased by 18.7 %-points, from
4.6 to 23.4 %. For native single mothers, there is no significant treatment effect. From
panel Ib and IIb of Table 4, it appears that outflow from welfare is not significantly
affected by the treatment. Panel Ic shows that for both immigrant single mothers and
native single mothers, the policies increased earnings; C95 per month for immigrant
single mothers and C62 per month for native single mothers. This means that immi-
grant single mothers increased their participation on average with about 3 h per week
and native single mothers with about 2 h per week.25 Welfare benefits go down for
both groups albeit the effect is only significant for immigrant single mothers. It is
reassuring that the reduction in welfare benefits because of the experiment is lower
than the earnings growth, since only part of the earnings (C4 per hour) are exempted
from welfare benefits.
Finally, a potential effect of the experiment is poverty reduction among single
mothers on welfare. This can also indirectly improve other aspects of life, such as
health and self-esteem of the single mother. Panel Ie shows that single mother welfare
recipients experience a net increase in their income, although this is only signifi-
cant for immigrant single mothers. When we compare the results in Table 4 with the
triple difference estimates in Table 3, we find that taking into account unobserved
heterogeneity and observed differences between single mothers does not change
22With regard to the control variables, Appendix Table 9 shows that the inflow into part-time employ-
ment increases with the age of the children and decreases with the number of children in the household.
Lone single mothers who receive alimony start working part-time sooner than single mothers without
any alimony and immigrants, especially first generation immigrants, are less likely to start a part-time
job in addition to their welfare benefits. The longer people are in welfare without a part-time job,
the less likely they are to start a part-time job (state dependence). Related to this, we find that the
unobserved heterogeneity term is significant (the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity term, α, is
significant).
23We choose a period of 2 years, such that all treatment effects in the table are based on the same treatment
of 2 years (the effects on earnings, welfare benefits, and income are also based on a treatment period of
2 years).
24Results are basically the same when using 200 replications.
2595/(C8×4 weeks)≈3 and 62/(C8×4 weeks)≈2.
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Table 4 Treatment effects—empirical models
Immigrants Natives
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
I. Parameter estimates total treatment effect
a. Finding (part-time) employment 1.778*** 0.640 −0.130 0.243
b. Outflow from welfare 0.237 0.402 −0.120 0.135
c. Earnings 0.095*** 0.027 0.062*** 0.022
d. Welfare benefits −0.051*** 0.010 −0.035 0.028
e. Income (earnings + welfare benefits) 0.044* 0.025 0.027 0.020
II. Average adjusted predictions and average marginal effects
a. Part-time employment within two years in welfare
1) No treatment 0.046 0.062 0.341*** 0.064
2) Treatment 0.234*** 0.048 0.307*** 0.036
2-1) Treatment effect 0.187** 0.078 −0.034 0.064
b. Outflow from welfare within two years in welfare
1) No treatment 0.220*** 0.059 0.505*** 0.050
2) Treatment 0.269*** 0.023 0.464*** 0.020
2-1) Treatment effect 0.049 0.053 −0.040 0.045
Earnings, welfare benefits, and income in C1000 per month. Panel I contains parameter estimates of
the treatment effects. Panel II contains average adjusted predictions and average marginal effects for the
inflow to part-time work and the outflow from welfare. The average adjusted predictions show the average
probability of part-time employment and outflow within 2 years after the start of a welfare spell, in case
all treated single mothers who entered welfare during the experiment would (or would not) have received
the treatment. The difference gives us the average marginal effect of the treatment. In the predictions,
unobserved heterogeneity is ignored, i.e., the unobserved individual specific effect (ui ) is assumed to be
one. For the bootstrapped standard errors in Ia, Ib, and II, we used 250 replications. For the standard error
with regard to the outflow of immigrants, we excluded one bootstrap replication with an impossible high
coefficient caused by an unfortunate combination of municipalities
the estimated treatment effects on the time to employment and outflow from wel-
fare,26 but increases the estimated treatment effects on earnings, welfare benefits,
and income.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis—heterogeneous treatment effects
As indicated before, municipalities applied different types of policies to per-
suade single mothers to find (part-time) jobs. All treatment municipalities allowed
26The average adjusted predictions with treatment in Table 4 can to some extent be compared with the
employment and outflow rates of treated parents in Table 3. However, the selection and underlying meth-
ods are different. The rates in Table 3 are collected from Figs. 3 and 4 and are based on all individuals that
participated in the experiment (also those who started their welfare spell before the experiment). Panel II
of Table 4, on the other hand, shows the employment and outflow rates only for individuals that entered
welfare during the experiment. They received the treatment as from the start of their welfare spell and the
employment and outflow rates are calculated using the model results.
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Table 5 Heterogeneous treatment effects
Immigrants Natives
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
I. Parameter estimates treatment effects
a. Finding (part-time) employment
Earnings disregard 1.592*** 0.552 −0.247 0.239
Job creation 0.486 0.639 0.562* 0.299
b. Outflow from welfare
Earnings disregard 0.369 0.560 −0.143 0.148
Job creation −0.544 0.499 0.086 0.328
c. Earnings
Earnings disregard 0.083*** 0.030 0.049** 0.023
Job creation 0.065*** 0.021 0.078*** 0.026
d. Welfare benefits
Earnings disregard −0.038*** 0.011 −0.025 0.031
Job creation −0.055*** 0.018 −0.057** 0.027
e. Income (earnings + welfare benefits)
Earnings disregard 0.045 0.027 0.025 0.021
Job creation 0.010 0.016 0.020 0.015
II. Average adjusted predictions and average marginal effects
a. Part-time employment within 2 years
1) No treatment 0.042 0.072 0.305*** 0.051
2) Earnings disregard 0.181*** 0.056 0.249*** 0.024
3) Earnings disregard + job creation 0.270*** 0.076 0.390*** 0.071
2-1) Effect earnings disregard 0.139** 0.066 −0.056 0.057
3-2) Effect job creation 0.089 0.112 0.141* 0.081
3-1) Total treatment effect 0.228** 0.111 0.085 0.074
b. Outflow from welfare within 2 years
1) No treatment 0.252*** 0.076 0.497*** 0.057
2) Earnings disregard 0.341*** 0.077 0.450*** 0.047
3) Earnings disregard + job creation 0.217*** 0.051 0.478*** 0.065
2-1) Effect earnings disregard 0.089 0.100 −0.047 0.048
3-2) Effect job creation −0.124 0.108 0.028 0.101
3-1) Total treatment effect −0.035 0.093 −0.019 0.093
Earnings, welfare benefits, and income in C1000 per month. Panel I shows the estimated treatment effect
of the earnings disregard and the estimated treatment effect of job creation on top of the earnings disregard.
Panel II contains average adjusted predictions and average marginal effects for the inflow to part-time
work and the outflow from welfare. See also note Table 4. For the standard error with regard to finding
(part-time) employment for immigrants, we excluded six bootstrap replications with an impossible high
coefficient caused by an unfortunate combination of municipalities
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single mothers in the treatment group an earnings disregard. In addition to that, some
municipalities stimulated direct job creation in the public and private sector. By way
of sensitivity analysis, Table 5 shows to what extent different policy measures had
different treatment effects.27 Panel Ia shows that for immigrant single mothers the
earnings disregard had a significant positive effect on the inflow to a part-time job
but job creation did not have a significant additional positive effect. The average
marginal effect in panel IIa shows that the earnings disregard increased part-time
employment within 2 years on average with 13.9 %-points, from 4.2 to 18.1 %. For
native single mothers, job creation (in addition to the earnings disregard) increased
part-time employment with 14.1 %-points (weakly significant). The implied value of
the elasticity of the participation rate is 0.3, which is well within the range presented
by Bettendorf et al. (2014).28 For the outflow from welfare, we find no significant
effect of either policy instrument.
As shown in panel Ic of Table 5, the earnings disregard increased earnings
of immigrant single mothers significantly with C83 per month, which implies an
increased participation of about 2.5 h per week (C83/C8×4 weeks) on average (as
suggested by Fig. 1, the growth in the number of hours worked per week is small).
For native single mothers, the effect of the earnings disregard on earnings was also
significantly positive (C49, about 1.5 h per week). For both types of mothers, job
creation had an additional significant positive effects on earnings. Single mothers
probably started jobs for more hours per week than they would have done without
direct job creation.
One of the aims of the experiment was to decrease welfare expenditures. When
the experimental instruments increase labor force participation and/or the number
of hours worked, and only part of labor income is exempted from the welfare ben-
efit, this has a positive effect on the welfare benefits paid by the municipality. On
the other hand, single mothers that already worked part-time before the experiment
was implemented now receive an earnings disregard of C4 per hour, whereas they
received nothing before the experiment. This has a negative effect on the amount of
welfare benefits per welfare recipient paid by the municipality. Panel Id of Table 5
shows that the positive effect dominates, but that the effect of the earnings disregard
is not significant for native single mothers. Job creation, additional to the earnings
disregard, significantly reduced welfare benefits for immigrant and native single
mothers by C55 and C57, respectively. The sum of welfare benefits and earnings is
not significantly affected.
27For this sensitivity analysis, we included a treatment variables function (like Eq. 2) for the six munici-
palities that implemented direct job creation, the period in which job creation took place, and the treatment
group.
28The employment rate of single mothers with young children in welfare is 20.7 % (Table 2). In our
estimates, we find that the earnings disregard increased the labor force participation (through part-time
work) by 13.9 %-points for immigrants and by −5.6 %-points for natives. This means a weighted average
of 13.9 ∗ 1/3 − 5.6 ∗ 2/3 = 0.9 %-points (about one third of the single mothers with young children
on welfare is immigrant). This implies an increase in the employment rate of 0.9/20.7 = 4.4 %. The
maximum earnings disregard is 30 euro/week. The welfare benefits are approximately 225 euro/week;
so the treatment is 30/225 = 13.3 %. Combining these numbers, we find an implicit elasticity of the
participation rate with respect to the net income gain when moving from welfare to work of 4.4/13.3 = 0.3.
1050 M. Knoef, J. C. van Ours
Table 6 Treatment effects: differentiated by age of the youngest child
Immigrants Natives
Age youngest child 0–4 5–11 0–4 5–11
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
I. Parameter estimates treatment effects
a. Finding (part-time) employment
Earnings disregard 1.444*** 0.361 1.801*** 0.526 −0.262 0.162 −0.228 0.205
Job creation 0.655* 0.388 0.310 0.709 0.544 0.540 0.595* 0.306
b. Outflow from welfare
Earnings disregard 0.316 0.655 0.442 0.542 −0.157 0.156 −0.122 0.200
Job creation −0.529 0.461 −0.579 0.475 −0.056 0.357 0.240 0.347
c. Earnings
Earnings disregard 0.096*** 0.034 0.076*** 0.028 0.043** 0.020 0.061** 0.030
Job creation 0.049 0.031 0.079*** 0.015 0.094*** 0.031 0.061** 0.028
d. Welfare benefits
Earnings disregard −0.055*** 0.014 −0.023* 0.013 −0.006 0.034 −0.047 0.030
Job creation −0.033 0.022 −0.076*** 0.021 −0.057** 0.025 −0.057* 0.031
e. Income (earnings + welfare benefits)
Earnings disregard 0.041 0.030 0.053** 0.025 0.037* 0.019 0.014 0.030
Job creation 0.016 0.017 0.003 0.020 0.037 0.023 0.004 0.019
II. Average adjusted predictions and average marginal effects
a. Part-time employment within 2 years
1) No treatment 0.039 0.056 0.044 0.079 0.289*** 0.058 0.324*** 0.059
2) ED 0.202*** 0.051 0.229*** 0.076 0.239*** 0.041 0.269*** 0.038
3) ED + JC 0.261*** 0.094 0.293*** 0.084 0.386*** 0.091 0.428*** 0.072
2-1) Effect ED 0.164*** 0.061 0.184*** 0.068 −0.050 0.047 −0.055 0.052
3-2) Effect JC 0.058 0.113 0.064 0.133 0.148* 0.084 0.159* 0.087
3-1) Total effect 0.222* 0.116 0.248** 0.124 0.097 0.079 0.104 0.083
b. Outflow from welfare within 2 years
1) No treatment 0.298*** 0.087 0.196*** 0.075 0.553*** 0.059 0.440*** 0.067
2) ED 0.419*** 0.129 0.286*** 0.075 0.511*** 0.076 0.402*** 0.066
3) ED + JC 0.266*** 0.068 0.173*** 0.040 0.595*** 0.096 0.478*** 0.061
2-1) Effect ED 0.121 0.124 0.090 0.095 −0.042 0.065 −0.037 0.060
3-2) Effect JC −0.153 0.114 −0.112 0.090 0.084 0.112 0.076 0.104
3-1) Total effect −0.032 0.099 −0.022 0.085 0.042 0.100 0.038 0.094
Earnings, welfare benefits, and income in C1000 per month. Panel I shows the estimated treatment effect
of the earnings disregard and the estimated treatment effect of job creation on top of the earnings disregard.
Panel II contains average adjusted predictions and average marginal effects for the inflow to part-time
work and the outflow from welfare. ED earnings disregard, JC job creation. See also note Table 4. For the
standard error with regard to finding (part-time) employment for immigrants, we excluded three bootstrap
replications with an impossible high coefficient caused by an unfortunate combination of municipalities
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5.4 Sensitivity analysis—heterogeneous treatment groups
Table 6 presents the parameter estimates of the heterogeneous treatment effect on
the various outcome measures if we distinguish two treatment groups, single moth-
ers with the youngest child aged between 0 and 4 years and single mothers with the
youngest child aged between 5 and 11 years.29 Panels Ia and IIa of Table 6 show the
estimated treatment effects for the inflow to part-time work. Comparing the param-
eter estimates with those in panels Ia and IIa of Table 5, it is clear that making a
distinction between two treatment groups does not add much to the insight in the pol-
icy effects. The parameter estimates for the two treatment groups are not significantly
different. Estimation results for the outflow from welfare are reported in panels Ib
and IIb of Table 6 and are also not significantly different for the two treatment groups.
Panel Ic of Table 6 shows that direct job creation was significantly effective for
the earnings of immigrants with children of age 5–11 (an income growth of C79 per
month) and natives with the youngest child aged between 0 and 4 years (C94 per
month) and 5–11 years (C61 per month), but not for immigrants with the youngest
child aged between 0 and 4 years. Regarding job creation, we measure the inten-
tion to treat. Immigrant single mothers with the youngest child between the age
of 0 and 4 are the most difficult category within the treatment group and are less
often approached by municipalities to participate in the labor pool. This may explain
the insignificant effect of job creation for this group. Immigrant mothers with the
youngest child aged between 5 and 11 years and native mothers with the youngest
child aged between 0 and 4 years probably start jobs of more hours per week than
they would do without direct job creation (since the time to employment was not
reduced by direct job creation, panel a).
The estimated treatment effects for welfare benefits, reported in panel d of Table 6,
are significantly different for immigrant single mothers with children between the
age of 0–4 and 5–11. The earnings disregard reduced welfare benefits significantly
for immigrant mothers with the youngest child between the age of 0 and 4 years, but
this is only weakly significant for immigrant single mothers with the youngest child
aged between 5 and 11 years. This can be explained by the fact that in the last group
(with older children), relatively more single mothers would have worked anyway
(also without the earnings disregard). In the experiment, these mothers received an
earnings disregard of C4 per hour, whereas they received nothing outside the exper-
iment. This reduced the financial advantage for the municipalities for this group.
Job creation as an additional instrument, on the other hand, is more effective for
immigrant single mothers with children between 5 and 11 years and for native sin-
gle mothers with children between 0 and 4 years. As explained above, immigrant
single mothers with the youngest child between 0 and 4 are probably less often
approached by municipalities. On the other hand, natives with the youngest child
aged between 5 and 11 years (the most ‘easy’ category within the treatment group)
are approached frequently but probably need less help in finding a job, such that the
effectiveness of direct job creation is only weakly significant for them. Finally, panel
29For this sensitivity analysis, we used interactions with a dummy variable indicating whether the youngest
child in the household was aged between 5 and 11 years.
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e of Table 6 shows the estimated treatment effects on income, which are not sig-
nificantly different for single mother with young (0–4 years) and old (5–11 years)
children.
5.5 Robustness checks
To check the validity of the results, Tables 7 and 8 present the results of two placebo
tests, i.e., we replace the actual treatment period by a placebo treatment period and
we replace the treatment municipalities by placebo treatment municipalities. Table 7
presents estimated treatment effects when we assume that the treatment already took
place in 2007–2008 instead of 2009–2010 (placebo treatment period). Except for
income, none of the variables of interest are significant (as it should be). Table 8
presents the results of 250 tests with placebo treatment municipalities. Here, we
randomly choose 14 placebo treatment municipalities from all municipalities in the
Netherlands, estimate the (placebo) treatment effects and repeat this test 250 times.
The first two columns of Table 8 show the parameter estimates (which can also be
found Table 4) and z values for the real treatment municipalities; the third and fourth
column show the parameter estimates and mean z values for the placebo treatment
municipalities. Comparing the first and the third column, it is clear that the average
treatment effects for the placebo municipalities are much smaller and often have the
opposite sign compared to the treatment effects for the real treatment municipali-
ties. The fourth column shows that on average, the treatment effects for the placebo
municipalities are all insignificant. Columns 5 to 9 show the distribution of z values
of the placebo tests. For example, the first row shows that the z value of the param-
eter estimate for the transition rate to (part-time) employment of immigrants in the
real treatment municipalities is 3.09, while the 99th percentile of the z values in the
placebo tests is 1.71. This means that (almost) none of the placebo treatment effects
are as significantly positive as the effect found in the experiment. This also holds for
earnings and welfare benefits of immigrants (the third and the fourth row). For earn-
ings of natives, we find that in somewhat more than 1 % of the placebo tests, the z
Table 7 Treatment effects for placebo treatment period
Immigrants Natives
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
I. Parameter estimates total treatment effect with placebo treatment period
a. Finding (part-time) employment −0.120 0.422 0.022 0.332
b. Outflow from welfare 0.184 0.377 −0.199 0.175
c. Earnings 0.024 0.048 −0.042 0.033
d. Welfare benefits −0.083 0.054 −0.001 0.025
e. Income (earnings + welfare benefits) −0.059* 0.032 −0.043** 0.020
Earnings, welfare benefits, and income in C1000 per month. Ia (natives) and Ib (immigrants and natives)
are estimated without unobserved heterogeneity because of convergence difficulties
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Table 8 Comparing treatment effects for real treatment municipalities and placebo treatment
municipalities
Real treatment
municipalities Placebo treatment municipalities
Mean Distribution z-values
Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value p50 p75 p90 p95 p99
Immigrants
a. Finding (part-time) 1.778 3.09 −1.050 −0.26 −0.20 0.24 0.90 1.28 1.71
employment
b. Outflow from welfare 0.237 0.82 −0.031 −0.09 −0.11 0.58 1.15 1.37 1.71
c. Earnings 0.095 3.48 −0.011 −0.29 −0.30 0.58 1.60 2.24 3.10
d. Welfare benefits −0.051 −5.04 0.009 0.25 0.24 −0.50 −1.20 −2.00 −4.68
e. Income (earnings + 0.044 1.80 −0.002 0.03 −0.15 0.78 1.70 2.48 4.52
welfare benefits)
Natives
a. Finding (part-time) −0.130 −0.42 0.045 0.08 0.01 0.64 1.28 1.73 2.26
employment
b. Outflow from welfare −0.120 −0.76 −0.002 −0.01 0.01 0.72 1.21 1.52 2.11
c. Earnings 0.062 2.87 −0.005 −0.05 0.00 0.87 1.51 1.95 2.91
d. Welfare benefits −0.035 −1.27 0.007 0.14 0.12 −0.70 −1.48 −1.91 −3.42
e. Income (earnings + 0.027 1.39 0.002 0.07 0.19 0.87 1.58 2.05 3.07
welfare benefits)
Earnings, welfare benefits, and income in C1000 per month. In this placebo test, we randomly choose
14 placebo treatment municipalities. We repeat this test 250 times. From left to right, this table reports
the treatment effects of the real treatment municipalities (also found in Table 4) and the accompanying z
values, the average treatment effect found for the placebo municipalities with the accompanying mean z
value, and the distribution of z values found in the placebo tests. We show the median z value and several
percentiles. With regard to welfare benefits (d), we show the 25th, 10th, 5th, and 1st percentile, because
we are interested how often a z value below −1.27 appears
value is higher than the z value found in the experiment. In the rows where treatment
effects of the experiment are not significant, roughly 5 % of the placebo tests show
significant treatment effect. Our main conclusion from Table 8 is that the effects we
measure are indeed real treatment effects.
In additional robustness checks not reported, we considered data selections with
more narrow ranges around the age limit of 12 years for the youngest child in the
household, such as the range from 7 to 16 years. The results hardly change. Only a
smaller age range leads to a significant reduction of welfare benefits for natives (on
average −88 euro instead of −35 euro found in Table 4). Furthermore, we consid-
ered selections of spells based on the cause of the welfare spell (end of job, end of
marriage, and end of education). The results are about the same, but less significant,
probably because of the smaller sample sizes.
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6 Conclusions
Single mothers with young children are often long-term recipients of welfare ben-
efits. Long-term welfare dependency creates a big distance to the labor market. If
single mothers on welfare would have a part-time job, they would increase their
work experience which might make it easier for them later in life to find a full-
time job and leave welfare. However, financial incentives to work part-time while
receiving welfare are not very strong. Usually, benefits are reduced one-for-one when
single mothers accept a job and start earning money. To explore the possibilities to
encourage single mother welfare recipients with young children to at least find a
part-time job, the Dutch government funded a policy experiment in 2009 and 2010.
In this experiment, an earnings disregard was introduced that was sometimes com-
bined with job creation. The experiment was performed at the level of municipalities
in the Netherlands. Our paper presents an analysis about the effectiveness of both
policies. We evaluate the effectiveness of the policy experiment by comparing the
calendar time periods before and during the experiment, the municipalities with and
without the experimental policy instruments and by comparing single mothers with
young children (who are treated) and single mothers with older children (who are
not treated). In our analysis, we make a distinction between native single mothers
and immigrant single mothers as the latter group has a particularly weak labor mar-
ket position. In addition, we differentiate the treatment effect for single mothers with
the youngest child between the age of 0 and 4 and single mothers with the youngest
child between the age of 5 and 11, as both have different needs for care. Our study
differs from most of the previous research on the labor supply of single mothers
on welfare because unlike many studies who use single women without children as
control group, we have as control group single mothers with older children. Further-
more, rather than focusing on one policy instrument, we are able to study for the
same group of individuals the separate effects of two policy instruments, a financial
incentive through the earnings disregard and a job opportunity through job creation.
Finally, whereas many studies are done in countries with relatively low benefits, we
study policy measures in a country with a relatively generous benefit system.
Our main findings are that the earnings disregard stimulated employment of immi-
grant single mothers and earnings of all single mothers. In addition, job creation
reduced welfare benefits and increased earnings for immigrant single mothers with
the youngest child between the age of 5 and 11 and for native single mothers. Regard-
ing job creation, we measure an intention to treat. This means that we do not have to
worry about a non-random selection of single mothers into the treatment and that we
take into account the success or failure that municipalities experience in finding jobs
for single mothers. Nevertheless, we may underestimate the potential effectiveness
of job creation. Welfare expenditures are reduced by the experiment. The earnings
disregard significantly reduced welfare benefits for immigrant single mothers. That
is because labor force participation increased for this group and almost no disregards
had to be paid to mothers that would also have worked without the financial incen-
tive. Income increased significantly for immigrant single mothers with the youngest
child between 5 and 11 years. This also implies favorable effects on the children in
these households. The earnings disregard and job creation do not provide incentives
How to stimulate single mothers on welfare to find a job 1055
to flow out of welfare in the short run, but they also did not reduce outflow from
welfare (the attractiveness of the instruments may keep single mothers in welfare).
The overall effect of earnings disregards is a combination of the effects of finan-
cial incentives and the monitoring by case workers as part of the new policy (some
treated mothers got an individual appointment with a case worker to inform them
about the experiment and review their situation). A surprising finding is that earn-
ings disregards are mostly effective for immigrant single mothers, who are at the low
end of the earnings distribution. A possible explanation for this finding is that usu-
ally immigrant single mothers were no target group in activation policies. Maybe the
effect for native single mothers is lower than for immigrant single mothers because
they were monitored already more strictly and were more engaged in activation poli-
cies. Furthermore, the lack of effects for native single mothers could have to do with
the situation in the labor market. During the period of the experiment, there was little
or no job growth in the Netherlands which could have influenced the results. On the
other hand, the labor market position of immigrant single mothers on welfare was
so weak that it could only improve by providing the right incentives. Maybe, it is
not the immigrant status itself that causes a higher receptiveness to the instruments.
For example, if immigrant single mothers have a lower education level on average,
and the effects of the policy instruments are higher for lower-educated single moth-
ers, this also explains the difference. Furthermore, maybe low wage individuals feel
more attracted by the earnings disregard as they benefit the most (relatively) from the
earnings disregard (they may keep a larger share of their earnings). If this is the case,
this may also explain the difference between immigrant and native single mothers,
when wage rates are on average lower for immigrant single mothers than for native
single mothers. Finally, native single mothers may receive more informal financial
support from their parents than immigrant single mothers whose parents live outside
the Netherlands. That would make native single mothers less sensitive to financial
incentives than immigrant single mothers.
The purpose of the policy experiment was to encourage single mothers on welfare
to enter the labor market if only through a part-time job. This would not induce them
to leave welfare but it might make it easier for them to find a full-time job later on
in life and then leave welfare. The goal of the experiment, to increase part-time work
among single mothers on welfare and decrease welfare expenditures, succeeded.
However, outflow from welfare did not increase. So, within the window of the data,
small part-time jobs did not (yet) function as a stepping stone. From a policy point of
view, the earnings disregard is an effective instrument to increase labor force partici-
pation and earnings of immigrant single mothers with children younger than 12 years.
Nevertheless, as predicted by comparing the budget constraint with and without the
experiment, the extra number of hours worked because of the policy experiment is
small. If one aims to reduce welfare benefits by using an earnings disregard, it would
be wise to lower the age limit of 12 years, to reduce the number of disregards given
to single mothers that would have worked anyway. Job creation, in addition to the
earnings disregard, also induces lower welfare benefits for single mothers with older
children.Of course the efficiency of job creation depends on the costs that municipalities
have to make to find jobs for the single mothers. Furthermore, after the implementa-
tion of an earnings disregard additional screening may be necessary, to prevent single
mothers to enter welfare because of the attractiveness of the earnings disregard.
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Appendix A: Extended figures
Inflow into part-time work
(a)  Treatment group (b)  Control group
Outflow from welfare
(c)  Treatment group (d)  Control group
Fig. 6 Inflow, outflow, and first differences for natives
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Appendix B: Extended estimation results
Table 9 Finding part-time employment and outflow from welfare
Finding part-time employment Outflow from welfare
Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
G −0.073 0.103 −0.035 0.060 −0.011 0.069 0.053 0.038
M · G −0.107 0.230 0.007 0.118 −0.129 0.226 −0.020 0.108
T −0.564*** 0.131 −0.429*** 0.074 −0.853*** 0.082 −0.819*** 0.040
M · T −0.975** 0.393 0.212 0.249 −0.254 0.271 0.179 0.126
G · T 0.190 0.116 0.182*** 0.061 0.398*** 0.073 0.276*** 0.035
G· M · T 1.778*** 0.640 −0.130 0.243 0.237 0.402 −0.120 0.135
Welfare 30–60 days 0.046 0.100 −0.025 0.057 0.047 0.104 0.065 0.056
Welfare 61–90 days −0.359*** 0.126 −0.288*** 0.069 0.263*** 0.098 0.377*** 0.054
Welfare 91–180 days −0.270* 0.147 −0.390*** 0.073 0.105 0.090 0.592*** 0.053
Welfare 181–365 days −0.510*** 0.140 −0.754*** 0.073 −0.071 0.090 0.576*** 0.053
Welfare 366–730 days −0.739*** 0.152 −1.018*** 0.074 −0.292*** 0.090 0.402*** 0.053
Welfare > 730 days −0.998*** 0.168 −1.303*** 0.091 −0.559*** 0.092 0.125** 0.056
Age 0.157*** 0.021 0.070*** 0.011 −0.043*** 0.011 −0.001 0.007
Age2 −0.002*** 0.000 −0.001*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
Age youngest child 0.067*** 0.015 0.051*** 0.011 −0.079*** 0.011 −0.014** 0.006
Age youngest child2 −0.001 0.001 −0.002** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.000
# Children −0.124*** 0.022 −0.121*** 0.014 −0.033** 0.014 −0.056*** 0.008
Unmarried 0.298*** 0.044 −0.014 0.023 −0.069** 0.034 −0.251*** 0.015
Widow −0.104 0.196 −0.707** 0.317 −0.004 0.130 0.081 0.104
First gen. immigrant −0.331*** 0.049 −0.153*** 0.052
Western immigrant −0.143*** 0.033 −0.097*** 0.019
Alimony 0.521*** 0.068 0.387*** 0.040 0.243*** 0.045 −0.408*** 0.029
Homeowner 0.209 0.163 0.083 0.065 0.294*** 0.110 0.213*** 0.035
Constant −10.256*** 0.375 −7.809*** 0.224 −5.754*** 0.250 −6.425*** 0.141
α (variance) 0.418** 0.176 0.231*** 0.083 0.062 0.059 0.065*** 0.021
# Individuals 20020 30172 22150 40132
G target group, M treatment municipality, T treatment period, P treatment municipality with job creation.
In this model, we also included year dummies, treatment municipality dummies, dummies indicating the
cause of welfare, and correction terms for treatment municipalities with a reemployment bonus. Unfortu-
nately, we do not have information about reemployment bonuses in control municipalities. However, for
all treatment municipalities, we know whether and in which years they provided reemployment bonuses
to the control group and the treatment group. To correct for this, we include interactions of year and the
provision of a reemployment bonus (yes = 1, no = 0). In addition, we allow these effect to be different
for the treatment and the control group
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
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